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Introduction  
This paper examines whether recent innovation in market design can address persistent problems 
of housing choice and affordability in the inner and middle suburbs of Australian cities. Australia's 
ageing middle suburbs are the result of a low density and highly car-dependent garden city 
greenfield approach to planning that failed to consider possible future resource or environmental 
constraints on urban development (Newton et al., 2011). Described as 'greyfield' sites in contrast to 
greenfield (signalling the change from rural to urban land use) and 'brownfield' (being the 
transformation of former industrial use to mixed use, including housing), intensification of 
development in such areas is expected to deliver positive social, economic and environmental 
outcomes (Trubka et al., 2008; Gurran et al., 2006; Newton et al., 2011; Goodman et al., 2010).  
Yet despite broad policy consensus progress remains elusive (Major Cities Unit, 2010). In this 
paper we argue that the application of market design theory, specifically through the internet-based 
coordination of market information, offers a new policy approach and practical measures to 
address these problems. 
 
New market design approaches such as smart markets and matching markets have enabled 
stunning improvements in resource allocation for a wide range of goods and services. However, to 
this point, their application to the housing sector has been limited. In this paper, we outline the 
theoretical and practical dimensions of market design theory, and discuss how its application to 
housing markets can challenge prevailing market structures, assist with greyfields redevelopment, 
and boost housing choice and affordability. 
 
The paper begins by discussing housing supply in Australia, with particular reference to the 
problems of securing multi-unit housing through existing market structures. We then make a case 
for diversification in housing procurement by introducing Housing Development Cooperatives 
(HDC) as a new sector particularly suited to delivering multi-unit housing. We argue that the 
viability of HDCs can be greatly enhanced by the application of market design theory, which is 
outlined in the section that follows. Here we focus on new market types – matching markets and 
smart markets – that are facilitated by increased computing power and the internet. Market theory 
is then applied to two housing sub-markets: private multi-unit residential development, and the 
affordable housing sector. In the former, the contribution of market design to aggregation and the 
central role of a smart market manager is explored. In the latter, the discussion focuses on the role 
of market design in unlocking new sources of land equity, specifically under-utilised land assets of 
not-for-profit agencies (NFP) and local government authorities. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of land trust mechanisms which could facilitate such land being part of the much 
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needed innovation in affordable housing supply. 
 
 
Background to multi-unit residential housing development in Australia  
There is a serious mismatch between new housing supply and demand in Australian cities. The 
National Housing Supply Council has forecast a substantial and growing gap in supply and 
demand of dwellings over the next few decades (NHSC, 2010). This mismatch includes location, 
type and affordability of dwellings. The ‘greyfields’ or middle ring suburbs in major Australian cities 
are identified in recent policy statements and critical analysis as the prime locus for solutions to this 
problem (Trubka et. al 2008; Gurran et al. 2006; Adams 2009; Newton et.al 2011; Goodman et.al 
2010).   
 Greyfield residential precincts are defined here as under-utilised property assets located in 
 the middle suburbs of large Australian cities, where residential building stock is failing 
 (physically, technologically and environmentally) and energy, water and communications 
 infrastructure is in need of regeneration. Greyfields are usually occupied and privately 
 owned sites typical of urban development undertaken from the 1950s to the 1970s (Newton 
 et al. 2011:1-2).  
 
The Australian residential development market is characterised by high rise apartments in and 
near the central business district; and tract development of low density, usually detached dwellings 
on the urban fringe (Berry, 1999; Alves and London, 2012). Table 1 shows the proportion of 
medium and high density dwelling approvals and commencements in 2011/12 remains under 50% 
of total housing supply, a proportion previously reached only for a short period in the mid-1960s. 
Medium density housing approvals comprise only a minor proportion of this total (Alves and 
London 2012). 
 
Table 1. Medium and high density (a) dwelling approvals as a proportion of total approvals, 
Melbourne, 1956/57 to 2011/12 (b) 
 
 
 
(a) Medium Density is defined as: Semi Detached row or terrace house, Flats units or apartments in a one or two or three 
storey block. High Density is defined as: Flats units or apartments in a four or more storey block 
(b) Data for 1956/57 to 1995/96 relates to dwelling commencements in the Melbourne Statistical Division, as defined at 
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the time of release. Data for 1995/96 onwards relates to dwelling unit approvals in the 31 Local Government Areas that 
comprise Melbourne Statistical District 
Source: ABS (1956/57 – 1983/84) Statistics of Victoria: Building Operations; ABS (1984/85 – 1995/96) Dwelling Unit 
Commencements Reported by Approving Authorities, Victoria, Cat. no. 8741.2; ABS (1996/97 – 2002/03) Building 
Approvals, Victoria, Cat. no. 8731.2 (customised tables) 
 
Research by Phan et al. (2008) and Ruming (2010) suggests residential development in the 
middle, greyfield suburbs is dominated by 'opportunistic' small scale multi-unit housing. These 
developers tend to build between three and five, one or two story attached dwellings on sites that 
formerly contained a single detached house. They are generally unconcerned with 'good' design 
and sustainability. Newton suggests this 'informal' development is undertaken by very small scale 
building firms and individuals, much of which is speculative (2011: 21). Notably, 'the uncoordinated 
nature of this redevelopment limits choice in dwelling design, performance and quality. Without 
strategic oversight, there are no corresponding improvements in infrastructure, servicing or 
amenity' (Newton et al. 2011: 21). There are also development firms building 'higher-density 
apartment typologies in response to strategic development policies' (Newton et al. 2011: 21). 
These developers have a corporate structure and fund projects through debt finance (Chandler, 
2009). These apartments too are often criticised for poor design, material quality and sustainability.  
Affordability, to the extent that it can be claimed, results from reducing floor space, ceiling height, 
reliance on borrowed light and sub-optimal ventilation. The norm is one or two bedrooms with an 
increasing number of studio apartments (that is, bedsits) being offered. New product is often priced 
above comparable detached stock, necessitating borrowing for those wishing to downsize. 
 
Despite the corporate residential development sector delivering a largely undifferentiated offering, 
this sector has both the size and technical capacity to embrace innovation, and has the potential to 
increase output. Accordingly, it is corporate residential developers with whom we are concerned 
rather than owner builders. However, as will be discussed shortly, there are also opportunities for 
new entities to engage in multi-unit development which we see as important for increasing the 
supply of affordable housing.  
 
Increasing dwelling density within the existing urban form is a key policy objective to improve the 
sustainability and efficiency of Australian cities; however a significant increase in the number of 
housing units has not been realised (Major Cities Unit, 2010). Planning regulation is cited as a key 
barrier resulting in considerable contestation about the nature of reform required. The other widely 
acknowledged hurdle, residential development finance (RDF), is the subject of limited research 
and policy debate. RDF is a critical consideration in the development process, a fact which became 
increasingly apparent following the recent global financial crisis (GFC). Renewed attention to risk 
meant that RDF became harder to obtain in Australia after the GFC. The cost of money and 
liquidity are highly influenced by global markets. However the cost of money also reflects 
development risks, which are generally local. These include land cost, consumer demand and 
capacity to pay, cost of materials, labour and, of course, planning and building regulations.  These 
variables have historically justified the argument that multi-unit residential development is high risk 
requiring a high rate of return. The consequence is a partially speculative industry, offset by 
financier's requirements for pre-sales as discussed in the following section.  
 
The loan application process for development finance is far from transparent. The lending policies 
of financiers and the key approval criteria are rarely explicit. Applications are assessed on a case 
by case basis by multiple levels of credit management hierarchy. Prospective borrowers are faced 
with lengthy negotiation periods following extensive information exchange about every detail of the 
project and the borrowers themselves. This complex credit assessment process can be 
compressed into the ‘Five Cs’ of credit assessment as indicated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The ‘Five Cs’ of Credit Assessment 
 
Five ’Cs’  Description  Includes 
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Character Appraisal of the borrower’s integrity  Character 
Competence identification 
Social and financial stability 
Honesty and reliability 
Capital Appraisal of the borrower’s financial strength  Assets and liability statement 
Title searches 
Gearing 
Capacity  Analysis of the borrower’s capacity to repay Cashflow 
Confirmation of income/project 
revenue 
Conditions Analysis of key external and internal factors  Loan conditions and covenants 
Market and economic conditions 
Collateral Appraisal of security available to support the 
borrowing 
Mortgage 
Guarantee 
Lien 
Multipartite agreements 
Fixed/floating charges 
Source: Adapted from Weaver and Kingsley (2001) and Weerasooria (1998). 
 
Even where credit worthiness can be established, project funding hinges on the most critical part of 
the development process: pre-sales (Bryant, 2012; PCA, 2012).  
 
 The presale role in lending criteria is two-fold. Firstly, it confirms the design and pricing of 
 the product is acceptable to the housing market (Conditions). Secondly, settlement of 
 presale contracts form the future cashflow/revenue for the project and therefore confirm the 
 Capacity of the project to repay its debts (Bryant, 2010: 390) 
 
Providers of RDF (primarily banks) require a nominated percentage of pre-sales prior to the 
extension of monies required to commence construction. The need to obtain pre-sales within a 
limited timeframe, in turn stifles innovative product development with a resulting loss of quality 
(Chandler, 2009). This may reflect the impact of 'cottage' investors purchasing apartments for 
future rental income (up to 60% of apartments1) or the high proportion of cottage investment may 
simply reflect what is being built. Chandler (2009) argues reliance on cottage investors has 
inhibited long overdue reform to the housing development sector.  In this context owner-occupiers 
are hard pressed to influence the apartment product coming onto the market. Furthermore, cottage 
investors, particularly those who have borrowed to purchase, are able to deduct the interest 
accruing on their loans against their other taxable income as a result of Australia's idiosyncratic 
negative gearing provisions. More recently investors can claim a tax rebate of around $10,000pa 
for period of ten years if they accept a tenant eligible for the National Rental Affordability Scheme 
(NRAS). This scheme requires a rental discount of 20% of market rents over the period. Both these 
schemes are ostensibly aimed at increasing the provision of rental housing. This is not the place to 
discuss the merits and efficacy of these schemes but it highlights the disadvantage of owner-
occupiers within the apartment market.  
 
Pre-sale involves the purchaser 'buying off the plan', or signing a contract with the developer prior 
to the property being completed and having its own certificate of title.  In some instances this will 
may occur even before the development is approved by the local planning authority. The purchaser 
pays a deposit which is held in a trust account. When the property is completed, the balance owing 
is paid and the property title transferred.  A significant advantage for purchasers in some Australian 
states is that they avoid paying stamp duty on the transfer of the title.  At the time of signing the 
                                                 
1 Chandler 2009: Landlords in Australia typically own  less than three properties (Hulse et al.. 2012). Unlike the 
US there is currently no large scale equity investment into long term private rental housing.  
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contract the purchaser will typically see architect's drawings, a floor plan,  a schedule of finishes 
and other disclosure documentation but will have little recourse if there are design changes.  In 
addition they have no control over who builds the development and have no guarantee of a 
completion date. It is possible that the development may not eventuate.  For the developers and 
financiers there is a risk of default at settlement and the subsequent legal process to enforce the 
contract an issue in 2008/2009 when purchasers were unable to obtain finance (Bryant, 2010). 
Bryant (2010) found a change arising from the GFC is that the pre-sale marketing costs are now 
covered by the developer's own equity contribution to the project rather than being funded by 
borrowings. This requires developers to prioritise projects to the most profitable only, further 
reducing the supply of affordable housing.  
 
For all of the importance of pre-sales, procurement appears to have altered little over past 
decades. Real estate agents are engaged to handle sales and inquiries, including operating 
display units. This typically costs around 2% of the dwelling sale price and up to 6% where 
investment marketing techniques are employed. Actual marketing costs are in addition to this and 
can include newspaper, magazine, internet, television and radio advertising, home show displays 
and even international trade delegations. Elaborate display suites are constructed and fitted out 
and glossy brochures produced all in the effort to entice a buyer to commit sometimes years in 
advance of any product being delivered. In short a lot of effort and money goes into finding buyers. 
The search problem is very considerable.  
 
Dolin et al. (1992) identified that a gap in the market existed for consumer initiated apartments. 
They recognised that while an individual could purchase an existing house or apartment, or could 
initiate the construction of a detached dwelling they were unable to initiate the construction of an 
apartment. Their response was to call for development cooperatives whose specific aim was to 
build multi-unit housing. They called this proposal 'Sector 4 Housing'2. Although the authors 
formed a cooperative in the early 1990s and built an apartment block in Perth, Western Australia, 
and established significant cost savings could be achieved their recommendations for establishing 
an 'Institute' to facilitate this form of development was not taken up by the Western Australian 
government or elsewhere in Australia. Forty years on people buying apartments remain with little 
choice other than developer initiated products.  
 
Since then some German state governments have facilitated 'terminating housing cooperatives' 
(THC) which operate along the line envisaged by Dolin et al. (1992). A cooperative is formed to 
undertake the development and then terminated when the development is finished, at which point 
strata titles are created.  These cooperatives are an established development model in Germany 
delivering significant cost reductions, and greater consumer satisfaction and housing performance 
(Alves and London, 2012). As the Office of the Victorian Government Architect (OVGA) notes it is 
‘rare for individual households to initiate multi-unit housing development in which they intend to 
own and/or occupy a unit...In effect, the housing development co-operative takes the place of the 
developer in a multi-unit development. By removing speculation from the development process, the 
households involved stand to make substantial cost savings, while also having far greater control 
over the outcome than if they were buying a unit ‘off the plan’’(OVGA 2012). Economic theory also 
suggests that the entry of HDCs into the market would place competitive pressure on corporate 
developers to lower prices and focus more on consumer preferences.  
 
Both the corporate (speculative) model and the cooperative (deliberative) development model rely 
on the timely engagement of the individual owner/investor to attract RDF to allow construction. This 
is where innovation in market design can be of immense value.  
 
Market design: smart markets and matching markets 
In setting out to apply market design theory it is important to appreciate the extent to which housing 
                                                 
2 Housing consumers can purchase an existing  house  or apartment, or can initiate the construction of a house but 
they cannot initiate the construction of a apartment. These other options are the other 3 sectors within the  Sector 4 
typology. 
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as a commodity deviates significantly from the ideal market. Smith suggests housing market 
behaviours require explanation(s) that are as unique as the asset class itself (Smith, 2011a). In 
classical economic theory the following features set housing apart from other types of assets: 
 
* Durability: houses are expensive and have long lives;  
* Fixity: houses are fixed in time and space; locality is an important aspect of desirability. This can 
result in disequilibrium in particular submarkets as a result of changes in demand; 
* Uniqueness and heterogeneity: each house is different because it is built in an exclusive space 
and the durability means there may be significant alterations over time;   
* Infrequency of trades; barriers exist to selling and buying housing; consumers have imperfect 
knowledge; search costs are high; purchase often involves some form of bidding;  
* Housing is more than a house: consumers purchase a bundle of attributes;  
* Supply (construction) time is lengthy, as are title transfers; 
* Housing is increasingly an investment as well as consumption. 
 
As Marsh and Gibb (2011) note a purchaser's decision to buy is heavily influenced by market 
intermediaries acting as gatekeepers reflecting the impact of such market imperfections. Within the 
context of such an imperfect market, understanding consumer preferences is an important issue 
for public policy and for supply-side investment. Yet as housing and planning debates in 
Melbourne show (see Birrell et al. 2012; Kelly et al. 2011) these market imperfections have serious 
and long lasting ramifications.  
 
Market design is a relatively new branch of economics that has developed from the convergence of 
game theory and experimental economics (Roth, 2007). Roth describes market design as 'a new 
branch of economics...[that] can create markets where there were none or fix them when they go 
wrong' (Roth, 2007: 1). This new capacity has been enabled by the vast increases in computing 
power and the internet. Two variants have emerged from the practical application of market design 
theory. These are two-sided matching markets, and smart markets.  Matching markets and smart 
markets facilitate transactions amongst a pool of participants rather than bilaterally between one 
buyer and one seller. Each aggregates and coordinates information, reducing transaction costs 
and minimising negative externalities (Stoneham and Thomas, 2011). 
 
Much of the success of matching and smart markets is owed to their ability to aggregate a critical 
number of potential buyers and sellers so that market participants can achieve a satisfactory 
transaction. In the language of market design, aggregation produces market thickness. Roth also 
identifies two other necessities. First, the market must be safe for the market participants. That is, 
participants must have the confidence and incentive to reveal the information they hold. Second, 
sometimes market processes can become victims of their own success: thickness can create 
congestion so market design must ensure transactions are conducted quickly and satisfactorily.  
 
In matching markets, market-like allocation occurs but price is not the mechanism that clears the 
market. In addition, the agents – the buyers and sellers – have specific requirements or conditions 
that must be met. One of the most celebrated matching markets is for kidney donation. A large 
proportion of people in need of a kidney transplant die each year because live donors (those willing 
to donate) are not compatible with the person they wish to donate to. Roth et al. (2007) modelled 
the potential for a paired donation process. They examined the possibility of exchanges between a 
pair of patient and willing but incompatible donor (typically a family member) and other such pairs. 
Transplants involving swaps between two pairs proved unfeasible. However when there was 
enough thickness in the market, that is, when there were sufficient numbers of pairs in a scheme, 
simultaneous swaps (transplants) could occur involving as a little as three pairs. Other examples of 
matching markets in the US are the hiring of new doctors (interns) and choice of school programs 
(Roth, 2007).  Matching markets in effect have become 21st century clearinghouses. 
 
The principle of the matching markets is evident in choice-based letting (CBL) (Pawson and Hulse, 
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2011; Hulse and Burke, 2007). CBL is a method of social housing allocation. 
 
 A Choice Based Lettings (CBL) scheme gives applicants the opportunity to bid for 
 properties which are most appropriate for their needs. A CBL scheme works by Local 
 Authorities and Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) advertising housing to potential 
 applicants via local newspapers, newsletters or on a website. The system then identifies the 
 successful bidder, which is the applicant who has the highest priority. In this case priority is 
 based on the applicant who has the most critical needs (Pavier nd: 1). 
 
Traditionally public housing aggregates eligible applicants by placing them on waiting lists. In the 
Australian context, waiting lists are segmented and housing is allocated according to priority. There 
are virtually no search costs. A tenant is called and given a small amount of time to accept an offer 
and there is significant disincentive to refuse.  
 
Choice-based letting has led to considerable improvement in the allocation process, greater tenant 
satisfaction and cost savings. CBL is possible because of the internet.  In market design terms 
CBL is a two-sided matching market. The term 'matching' is used to denote that price is not the 
mechanism that clears the market and that the 'agents' - the tenant and landlords in this case - 
have specific criteria that both want met. On the social housing side it is eligibility criteria; and for 
the tenants the specific housing on offer needs to conform to their needs and desires. With CBL a 
pool of social housing providers exists on one side and a pool of tenants exists on the other. A 
platform – an internet marketplace – enables their mutual preferences to be sorted and matched 
efficiently and quickly. 
 
In smart markets price plays its traditional role in clearing the market. Smart markets operate in a 
range of settings including the wholesale electricity and gas markets (Oren, 2004; Pekec and 
Rothkopf, 2003), mobile phone spectrum rights and airport take-off and landing slots. The latter 
two markets are characterised by the need for purchasers to buy a suite of rights; for phone users, 
the ability to call is dependent on the receiver's ability to take that call. Similarly, airlines need 
destinations as well as points of origin. The selling of such rights is typically through combinatorial, 
on line auctions. Smart markets are in development or have been proposed for traffic congestion 
(Markose et al. 2007) and water pricing (Raffensperger, 2009). In Victoria, the Department of 
Sustainability and Environment (DSE) has established a smart market for vegetation offset (DSE, 
2012) and Victorian Treasury officials have proposed smart markets for planning issues including 
car-parking requirements, developer contributions and planning objections (Stoneham and Thomas 
2011)., 
 
The application of market design theory to housing is under-developed. Albrecht et al. (2006) have 
applied the theory of matching markets to the buying and selling of existing house stock. This 
exploratory analysis highlights the extent to which housing deviates from the economic ideal, which 
in part explains why there are persistent market inefficiencies.  
 
Nevertheless smart market pioneer Charles Plott created a smart market to sell apartments in the 
US (Intellimarket, n.d). Plott noted that auctions of apartments (where all apartments go to auction 
at once) meant buyers who failed to gain their first preference were not in a position to bid for their 
second preference. This meant sub-optimal prices for vendors. The smart market enabled 
purchasers to simultaneously lodge bids on multiple dwellings but remain liable for only a single 
purchase. As all the bids are lodged at the same time, the sale prices remained higher than it 
would have otherwise been.  
 
If we look at the German experience of THCs, the state has supported the formation of 
aggregators or seller/agents in the terminology of market design. These aggregators are 
predominately architect-led. In effect a two sided matching market has been brought into existence 
to overcome the failure of the market to match supply and demand. Current aggregation for THCs 
however is small scale.   
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Aggregation is the key to efficient allocation of social housing and the formation of THCs. 
Theoretically, aggregation could occur for the sale and purchase of existing private housing in 
Australia.  However, in the following section we explore how the application of aggregation and 
market design theory could work in improving the supply of new multi-unit housing in existing urban 
areas where policy-makers are seeking housing intensification. Specifically we consider the cost 
impact on corporate residential development.  
 
A leap forward: aggregation of housing consumers  
The Australian housing system is with one major exception (social housing) characterised by bi-
lateral trades – that is, sales are between a single seller and single buyers. The creation of a pool 
of potential buyers on one side, and a pool of developers/development opportunities on the other 
offers the potential to reduce the search costs associated with obtaining pre-sales. Aggregation 
enables potential purchasers to be pre-identified and their preferences assessed, and allows for 
communication with developers prior to major decisions being made. It not only telescopes the 
campaign for pre-sales but opens the way for a far more collaborative approach to development. 
The onus is on developers to consider their brand and product offer.  As a key risk can be 
substantially avoided development need not be speculative. Indeed, with buyers literally on the 
ground at project conception, especially owner-occupiers, community hostility to increasing density 
may also be mitigated. Figure 1 conceptualises the aggregation and decision-making process. 
 
Figure 1.Smart Housing Market Pathways 
 
 
 
Large scale aggregation of buyers is not something an individual developer would be likely to 
undertake, but it is the ideal function for a third party who could provide it as a service to both 
buyers and sellers. The aggregator could be the market manager. For our purposes, if you have a 
Smart Housing Market (SHM) there needs to be a Smart Housing Market Manager (SHMM). 
 
For its users the SHM is an interactive website where they can manage their profiles, browse, and 
learn (there is a substantial opportunity for on-line education tools relating to all aspects of 
purchasing, selling, renting and maintaining housing). Vendors (in this case corporate residential 
developers) can promote their previous developments, not just the current project. They can 
innovate to provide not just high quality virtual tours but housing avatars to assist buyers make 
decisions. Potential buyers can be invited to meetings or tours of existing properties.  
 
In order to appreciate the extent of innovation we can compare the SHM to websites that advertise 
real estate, such as domain.com.au and realestateview.com.au. These websites are advertising 
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sites with limited functionality or interactivity. Potential purchasers browse the advertisements 
which direct them to vendors, usually real estate agents. Buyers can register on these websites but 
can only access a limited dashboard of search tools. The website manager has very limited 
knowledge of what the consumer wants. So long as they get hits, advertisers seem happy. 
However, the popularity of these websites suggests at least some level of acceptance of internet-
based transactions by housing consumers.   
 
The SHMM on the other hand actively recruits potential buyers, obtains their preferences and 
capacities and matches them to opportunities (that is, segments them). Developers then have the 
opportunity to shape their offering to actual consumer preferences. They then have the opportunity 
to seek a level of commitment prior to purchasing land and/or seeking RDF.  
 
A SHM is a communication tool. For THCs, or as we prefer to call them Housing Development 
Cooperatives (HDCs), aggregation of member/purchasers is as critical to their project finance as it 
is for corporate developers. HDC members need to commit early in their project. But real life gets 
in the way of good intentions, and people will pull out, potentially jeopardising projects.  Large 
scale aggregation and segmentation provides the answer.  A HDC may form to build a 20 dwelling 
apartment block, but having people drop out is a risk. Knowing that there are another 30 would-be 
buyers on a waiting list, of whom 20 could literally step into the breach substantially reduces the 
risks for everyone. The SHM is the mechanism by which HDC members can find each other, and 
find a development opportunity.  In a sense the SMH works as a kind of crowd sourcing.  
 
One of a SHM’s desirable features is its capacity to service a range of markets concurrently. The 
larger the scale the more efficient it is.  Large scale aggregation permits robust segmentation into 
specific housing tenure or options. For example the SHM can also aggregate private rental tenants 
enhancing the efficiency of the NRAS by permitting developers to avoid the ‘double search’ 
problem (finding purchasers of the apartments and attracting tenants who must be assessed 
according to eligibility criteria). Aggregation of tenants would benefit equity investment into long-
term private rental, as proposed by Landcom (2010).  As the reference to NRAS tenants suggests, 
a SHM can overcome some 'market failures' for community housing organisations. In the next 
section we will outline how a SHM can support innovation in the affordable housing sector. 
 
Affordable Housing - NFP sector 
The affordable housing sector is largely comprised of not-for-profit organisations that in the 
majority of cases provide subsidised rental housing to people eligible for public housing.  These 
organisations have in recent times been required to register as housing associations or providers 
in order to capture capital grants from government. There are not-for-profit organisations that have 
opted not to seek registration and their funds are derived from private sources.  Historically, such 
organisations have supplied housing to client groups via a variety of arrangements.  Land and/or 
dwellings were sometimes donated or bequeathed by private individuals, families or communities  
in exchange for life tenure of a specific person in need, or to address a more general need. Ground 
lease arrangements were quite common. In the case of independent living units (ILUS), the federal 
government provided funding for construction where local government or communities could 
supply land (McNelis, 2007). Service organisations such as Rotary, Lions and the RSL remain 
substantial providers of ILU accommodation for older people (McNelis and Sharam, 2011). ILUs 
can be rented or a licence to occupy purchased. Purchase options are far less common for other 
affordable housing types. Shared equity schemes have been mooted but these have remained 
mostly within the province of governments.   
 
Capital for housing associations and providers is subject to the periodic funding derived from the 
National Affordable Housing Agreement (NAHA), although the National Economic Stimulus Plan 
(NESP) separately funded over 19,000 dwellings and the Victorian Government provided an 
additional  $510m over four years in the 2007/08 budget (VCOSS, 2009). A consequence of the 
NESP, coinciding as it did with a sharp decline in housing affordability, was interest from NFP 
organisations with land equity but who had not previously provided affordable housing. However, 
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as the purpose of the NESP was to quickly generate economic activity these NFPs were poorly 
positioned to take advantage of the funds. They nevertheless remain interested in housing 
provision and have land but lack a source of capital for construction.  At present there is only 
anecdotal evidence as to the scale of available land held by NFPs that could be utilised for 
affordable housing, and no simple methodology for calculating it.  
 
However, there is every reason to believe that significant land or airspace may be available 
(McShane, 2006; Mian, 2008). Consistent with the historical growth patterns of NFPs and 
membership organisations, a proportion of these assets are located in greyfields areas (Barraket, 
2008; Leigh, 2010; Lewi and Nichols, 2010; Lyons, 2001). Ageing assets and declining 
membership pose organisational dilemmas for managing buildings. Sale onto the open market is 
often the easiest solution, although, as the sale of the inner-Melbourne Ascot Vale Bowls Club in 
2001 demonstrated, such a move can be highly contentious. In this case the local community had 
purchased land in the early twentieth century to establish a lawn bowling club (bowling being a 
sport).In the 1990s,faced with declining membership and revenue, a core membership group 
changed the club’s constitution (which specified long-term retention of the asset in community 
hands) to permit sale of the now highly sought-after site, with the sale proceeds distributed to the 
members. The prospect of such windfall gains from sale in the private market can induce 
opportunistic behaviour and permanent loss of a community asset. Many NFP organisations, of 
course, are likely to be deeply troubled by the ethics of such actions, but nonetheless face real 
revenue pressures. Anecdotal evidence suggests many NFPs are open to development 
alternatives that deliver affordable housing. Research currently being undertaken by Sharam and 
McShane seeks to understand what land resources may be available, and the constraints on NFP 
re-purposing such land for housing. 
 
As the current NAHA winds down and negotiation commences for the next agreement, little capital 
is available for constructing affordable housing (noting that NRAS sits outside the NAHA). In short 
the affordable housing sector has access to a source of land but limited public funding for 
construction. In addition to this however is the problem of a growing group of households which 
have been priced out of homeownership and face a lifetime in private rental, with immense 
implications for their retirement. This cohort however is mostly comprised of people who are not 
poor. Sharam (2011) has proposed equity land trusts (ELTs) to capture this latent equity for 
construction of affordable housing units for older single women.  
 
This 'Smart Homes' proposal separates the ownership of the land from the ownership of the 
dwelling using a 'land trust' agreement. The corporate structure for a land trust is generally a 
company limited by guarantee with charitable objectives to provide housing to those that are 
unable to purchase on the open market. The owner of the dwelling has a strata title to the dwelling 
and the Trust either owns the land (it may be gifted to the Trust or purchased by the Trust) or the 
Trust leases it at a peppercorn rate from a benefactor. Where freehold title is transferred to the 
land trust, the land trust holds the land in perpetuity and the value of the land is excluded from any 
of the costs an owner is expected to pay on purchase.  In this way the end cost to the owner of a 
dwelling is reduced.  The Trust and the donors determine who would be eligible to purchase a 
Smart Home. This way Smart Homes can provide perpetually affordable homes. An owner can 
bequeath or sell to another eligible person otherwise the Trust must re-purchase the dwelling. The 
re-sale price is determined at entry into the scheme - usually the price will reflect the original 
purchase price plus inflation. Purchasers can also rent out their home but there would be 
restrictions to prevent profiteering. 
 
Purchasers pay for the dwelling in the same way as they would any house in the market using 
savings and/or getting a mortgage. Construction is undertaken by a not-for-profit developer such 
as a Housing Association, or using the Housing Development Cooperative model in which the 
future owners take the role of developer thereby reducing the costs. By reducing the cost of the 
land to practically zero and reducing the cost of construction, housing purchasers can buy for as 
much as half they would pay in the existing market. 
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If leasing occurs a ground lease can be used to protect everyone’s interests and determine future 
use on the site. Ground leases are commonly used in the UK and are typically long term (e.g. 
some leases are up to 999 years) leases.  The leasehold owner, as commonly referred to, pays a 
capital sum at the commencement of the lease and a nominal sum (e.g. 10 pounds) throughout the 
term to the freehold owner termed a 'ground rent'. The rights a leasehold owner has under a 
ground rent are akin to that of a freehold owner. The leasehold owner is able to develop the 
premises as it so wishes and is responsible for all payments relating to the premises whilst the 
landlord/freehold owner is responsible for the structure of the building (where the dwelling is an 
apartment) or the land. Ground leases are commonly used by local governments for a range of 
social purposes. They are particularly attractive to local government and not-for-profit organisations 
that wish to use their land assets strategically to deliver their mission. Councils for example often 
have car parks where the airspace is un-developed. Such organisations may want to develop or 
use the ground level for a community purpose, and add value by building apartments above. The 
land trust and ground lease preserve the donor's ownership of the land and controls future use on 
the site. 
 
Smart Homes provides the purchaser with a subsidy so eligibility rules need to be devised to reflect 
the public interest in providing that subsidy. Land donors consult with their members or community 
regarding who they would like to target for a Smart Home. Each donor community will have a 
different priority.  
 
The 'land trust' is managed by an independent board and is charged with managing the physical 
assets (which can also include commercial, community or retail space) and the process for buying 
and selling Smart Homes, as well as building new homes. Each land trust is supported by a shared 
services company to keep costs down. 
 
Land trusts, where dwelling property rights are separated from the land property right (retained by 
the NFP but 'donated' to the dwelling occupier), offer a new basis for affordable housing 
construction if supported by new mortgage products. Smith has noted both the dearth of attention 
to private housing finance and the lack of innovation in the fundamentals of mortgage finance 
(Smith, 2011b). Smart Homes would require mortgage product innovation by a conservative 
industry. However, the history of strata title provides a lesson, both in terms of market design 
fundamentals driving reform and the role of mortgage finance in supporting reform. Strata title 
provides for individual ownership of a dwelling within a multi-unit residential property and common 
ownership and responsibility of the associated common property. Common property may include 
driveways, stairwells, lifts, roofs, and gardens (Everton-Moore et al. 2006). Strata title was 
introduced in Victoria until the early 1960s. Prior to that time individual flats could be rented but not 
purchased. 'Cooperative' flats (as strata title was initially called) were already common in Sydney 
by then and were financed through credit cooperatives providing mortgages supported by 
government guarantees. In Melbourne insurance companies (who were significant providers of 
mortgages) would not initially lend for strata title properties (The Australian Women's Weekly, 
1969).  
 
Equity land trusts (ELT) are analogous to strata title properties. What is 'common ownership' under 
strata title becomes 'community ownership' under the ELT. Yet a shift in mortgage lending 
practices is required. Fifty years ago the lending industry looked to the fundamentals: a legal, 
enforceable property right and securitisation. ELTs also provide these.  The history of strata title, 
however, contains a bigger lesson. Law reform and innovation in financing created a new market 
and promoted a new, affordable housing supply.  
 
The SHM can provide the infrastructure for recruiting ELT purchasers. It can work with NFPs to 
bring land onto the 'market' and facilitate development finance and mortgage finance for buyers.  
The SHM would be the home for later sale or rental of ELT homes. If run as a NFP itself, the SHM 
could use the profit from its private clients to support NFPs, land donors and ELTs, including the 
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possibility of purchasing land. At scale a SHM would have a very considerable turnover. 
 
We imagine that many ELTs would contract housing associations to construct and manage their 
properties providing a new revenue source to these organisations. Similarly housing associations 
would be well positioned to undertake project management and construction on behalf of HDCs.  
For those housing associations providing housing to moderate income households, the search 
costs for eligible tenants would be dramatically reduced if the SHM acted as aggregator.   
 
We also imagine that some NFPs would see residential property development as a viable 
investment vehicle. A SHM means reduced development risks, and property development may be 
viewed as a better performer than other investment classes such as shares.  So in addition to 
HDCs bringing competition into the private residential development sector, a new breed of NFPs 
with land assets could bring powerful branding and further competition into the market.  Housing 
associations should be significant beneficiaries of these innovations.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Computational power and the internet has revolutionised markets and brought a new focus on the 
significance of market design. Inefficient allocation problems are being overcome by matching 
markets and smart markets through the aggregation of buyers and sellers. This innovation can be 
applied to housing to overcome some intractable problems of housing supply in the greyfield areas 
of Australian cities. By bringing housing consumers forward in the supply chain, development costs 
and risk can be reduced. The construction of apartments would be far less speculative and more 
responsive to consumer preferences, enhancing choice and affordability. A smart housing market 
would facilitate the identification of new sources of land for affordable housing; herald the rise of 
equity land trusts; foster innovation in mortgage products; give life to housing development 
cooperatives; strengthen housing associations; promote competition and reform in the private 
sector; promote good urban design; and hold the potential to reduce neighbourhood conflict 
around planning issues. 
 
The growing use of mechanisms such as land trusts can be seen in the context of wider 
international interest in ownership models, social enterprise and cooperative or community-based 
resource management. The stability of new community-based institutions in the areas of housing 
and finance was amply demonstrated during the recent global financial crisis (Kelly, 2011). The 
design of new corporate structures and market instruments to produce what Kelly refers to as 
generative rather than extractive economic benefits is an evolving area of policy and practice that 
holds the potential to positively contribute to many intractable issues such as housing affordability 
and sustainable urban growth. 
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